Context-Aware Wireless Small Cell Networks: How to Exploit User
  Information for Resource Allocation by Khanafer, Ali et al.
Context-Aware Wireless Small Cell Networks: How
to Exploit User Information for Resource Allocation
Ali Khanafer∗, Walid Saad†, and Tamer Bas¸ar∗
∗Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA, Email: {khanafe2,basar1}@illinois.edu
†Wireless@VT, Bradley Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Blacksburg, VA, Email: walids@vt.edu
Abstract—In this paper, a novel context-aware approach for
resource allocation in two-tier wireless small cell networks (SCNs)
is proposed. In particular, the SCN’s users are divided into two
types: frequent users, who are regular users of certain small
cells, and occasional users, who are one-time or infrequent users
of a particular small cell. Given such context information, each
small cell base station (SCBS) aims to maximize the overall
performance provided to its frequent users, while ensuring that
occasional users are also well serviced. We formulate the problem
as a noncooperative game in which the SCBSs are the players.
The strategy of each SCBS is to choose a proper power allocation
so as to optimize a utility function that captures the tradeoff
between the users’ quality-of-service gains and the costs in terms
of resource expenditures. We provide a sufficient condition for
the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
for the game, and we show that this condition is independent of
the number of users in the network. Simulation results show
that the proposed context-aware resource allocation game yields
significant performance gains, in terms of the average utility per
SCBS, compared to conventional techniques such as proportional
fair allocation and sum-rate maximization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continuously increasing demand for bandwidth-
intensive wireless services mandates major structural changes
to today’s wireless cellular networks [1]. One key change is
in the deployment of low-power, low-cost, small cell base sta-
tions (SCBSs), overlaid on existing cellular infrastructure [2],
[3]. Such small cells, operating in the licensed spectrum
and deployed both indoors (femtocell at home) and outdoors
(operator-deployed picocells and microcells), allow for reduc-
ing the distance between users and their serving stations, thus
resulting in a dramatic increase in the wireless capacity. It is
expected that the next generation of wireless cellular networks
will consist of a dense and widespread deployment of small
cells, varying in range and capabilities.
Despite its immense technological benefits, the deployment
of small cell wireless networks introduces numerous tech-
nical challenges at different levels such as resource man-
agement [4]–[7], self-organization [8]–[10], and interference
management [11]–[13]. In [4], the authors discuss the use
of various coordination techniques for mitigating interference
while focusing on 3GPP standard-oriented approaches. The
authors in [5] propose a joint power and subcarrier resource
This research supported in part by an AFOSR MURI Grant FA9550-10-
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1443159 and CNS-1513697.
allocation scheme for small cell networks in which users are
prioritized based on their quality-of-service (QoS) needs. The
optimal allocation of traffic between different, heterogeneous
spectrum bands using a multi-mode femtocell is studied in [6].
The work in [7] studies the mobility enhancements needed
to maintain desirable performance in small cell networks. A
distributed game-theoretic approach for interference manage-
ment is presented in [8], while [9] develops a hierarchical self-
organizing approach for power allocation in two-tier small cell
networks. Other interesting aspects of resource allocation in
small cell networks are studied in [10]–[14].
Although they present interesting approaches for handling
resource allocation in small cell networks, most of these
existing works optimize the system performance under the
assumption that only physical layer metrics, such as channel
gain and power capabilities, are necessary for such optimiza-
tion. In practice, given the proximity of the small cells to
their users and the density of small cell deployment, the small
cell network can harness a large amount of information on
each user; thus, they can provide a better approach to resource
allocation. In particular, a context-aware resource management
mechanism is seen as a suitable and enabling approach for
exploiting new information on the users – such as smartphone
type or even social metrics – to better allocate resources in
the small cell network. While the notion of context-aware
resource allocation has been studied in conventional cellular
systems such as in [15]–[17], these approaches are not tailored
to the specifics of small cell networks. Moreover, unlike such
existing works [15]–[17], this paper will exploit previously un-
explored context information to optimize small cell networks.
The main contribution of this paper is its development of
a novel, context-aware resource allocation scheme for small
cell networks that exploits its historical knowledge on the
users to predict their resource requirements and optimize the
overall resource allocation performance. In particular, in dense
small cell networks, where each small cell base station (SCBS)
covers a relatively small geographical area, the SCBSs can be
very effective in predicting the resource usage patterns of their
frequent users. A frequent user is a user who has been regularly
visiting a given small cell over time. An example of such a
user is a student who uses the same campus SCBSs every
day. Here, the SCBS can monitor the data requests of such
users and, then, exploit this information to proactively allocate
resources to them. In essence, deploying SCBSs with limited
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coverage allows for a more focused view of the network, as
each SCBS needs only to interact with a limited number of
users as opposed to the classical cellular networks where the
macro-cell base station handles a massive number of users.
We formulate this context-aware resource allocation prob-
lem as a noncooperative game, and we provide a sufficient
condition for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Further, we provide a method for computing this equilibrium.
In this game, the SCBCs optimally allocate their powers so
as to optimize the tradeoff between maximizing the data rate
to all users (frequent and non-frequent) and minimizing the
misspending of resources based on the knowledge of the
demands of frequent users. Subsequently, our results show
that, by endowing the SCBSs with such an ability to predict
and learn the usage patterns, we can significantly boost the
performance of the network and lead to improved rates, com-
pared to classical techniques such as sum-rate maximization
or proportionally fair allocation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the proposed context-aware system model. In Sec-
tion III, we formulate the problem as a noncooperative game
and study the game’s properties. Simulation results are pre-
sented and analyzed in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section V. An Appendix contains the proof of the
main result of the paper.
II. CONTEXT-AWARE SYSTEM MODEL
From the perspective of each SCBS, we can categorize
user equipments (UEs) into two main groups: frequent and
occasional users. Here, frequent users are those users who
regularly access a certain SCBS. For these frequent UEs, the
SCBSs are able to predict the resources required to serve them.
As a result, we consider that each SCBS will strive to meet the
demand requirements of its frequent users (which it learned
over time). In contrast, occasional users are those who make
sporadic uses of the SCBSs. For example, they can be seen as
mobile users who are passing by the coverage area of an SCBS
at one time, but do not often return there. Traffic patterns
of mobile UEs can vary considerably based on the type of
services requested. Indeed, UEs differ in the way they utilize
the spectrum; while some use their smartphones for voice
mainly, others use them for social media and video streaming.
For frequent users, the SCBSs can generally observe the
regular traffic and usage patterns. Consequently, we define the
notion of context-aware resource allocation as the ability of
SCBSs to learn the traffic patterns of their frequent users and,
hence, be able to service them better.
In the network considered, each SCBS attempts to maximize
the sum-rate it provides to all UEs served (frequent and occa-
sional). Naturally, the provided rate depends on the amount
of power allocated which, in turn, depends on each user’s
QoS requirements. For frequent users, as the SCBS knows
their traffic patterns ahead of time, we assume that each SCBS
knows the amount of resources required by its frequent UEs.
For the occasional users, such an assumption does not hold
since occasional UEs have limited interaction with the SCBSs
and can be one-time visitors.
For each UE, an SCBS must provide the exact amount
of required resources, to meet the QoS needs. On the one
hand, if an SCBS provides a UE with an insufficient amount
of resources, then the UE will not experience the required
QoS. On the other hand, even though providing a UE with
more resources than it requests can boost the overall sum-rate,
the scarcity of the spectrum imposes that each SCBS utilizes
its resources wisely and sparingly. For example, instead of
spending extra power on an occasional UE that did not request
it, the SCBS can exploit this additional resource to improve the
performance of its regular, frequent users. To discourage such
misspending of resources, next, we will propose a resource al-
location mechanism in which the SCBSs optimizes the tradeoff
between maximizing the overall sum-rate and minimizing the
cost incurred by misspending resources.
The broadcast nature of wireless networks leads to inter-
ference between the SCBSs in the downlink. Therefore, the
choice of a resource allocation scheme at one SCBS will deter-
mine the interference level experienced on other, neighboring
SCBSs. Moreover, in small cells, it is of interest to develop
self-organizing resource allocation mechanisms in which each
SCBS optimizes its own, individual objective, without relying
on a centralized control and with little coordination with
its neighboring SCBSs. Due to this interdependence of the
resource allocation decisions due to factors such as mutual in-
terference and the need for self-organization, we will formulate
the resource allocation problem as a strategic, noncooperative
game [18].
III. CONTEXT-AWARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME:
FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
Consider the downlink of a two-tier small cell network
composed of M SCBSs and N UEs. We let M be the set
of all SCBSs and N be the set of all UEs. Let N i1 , N i2 be
the sets of frequent and occasional users served by SCBS i,
where N i1 ∩N i2 = ∅, and N i1,N i2 ⊆ N , for all i. Also, define
Ni = N i1 ∪ N i2 , Ni := |Ni|, N i1 := |N i1|, and N i2 := |N i2|.
Note that a given UE could be categorized as frequent by one
SCBS and occasional by another. Also, note that SCBS i can
serve a strict subset of N and does not necessarily serve all
users in the network. Formally, we allow for scenarios where
Ni ⊂ N .
We assume that the SCBSs share the same spectrum and
have access to the same K subcarriers (or channels). We
denote the set of the subcarriers by K. We assume that
each SCBS performs subcarrier allocation using an efficient
allocation technique from the literature [2], [5], [19]. Two
SCBSs will interfere if and only if they allocate power to
a given user over the same subcarrier. Further, we assume
that there is no inter-user interference on a given subcarrier.
In other words, we assume that each subcarrier can be used
by only one UE. Since the number of users can be very
large compared to K, we assume that N is the set of users
selected (out a larger population) by the subcarrier allocation
at the SCBSs. To this end, we assume that K ≥ N . Our
setting can be extended to allow for inter-user interference
(hence, allowing for K < N ), but we restrict our attention
to the no inter-user interference case in this paper in order to
demonstrate the idea of context-aware resource allocation.
Let Ki ⊆ K denote the set of subcarriers available to SCBS
i, and let Ki := |Ki|. Note that with these definitions SCBS i
is allowed to use a strict subset of the subcarriers only, i.e., we
allow for scenarios where Ki ⊂ K. We introduce the mapping
pii : Ki → Ni, where pii(k) ∈ Ni is the user to be served over
subcarrier k, according to the subcarrier allocation performed
at SCBS i. By our assumptions, the mapping pii is one-to-one
and onto.
Let uij [k] ∈ R≥0 be the power allocated by SCBS i ∈M to
UE j ∈ N over subcarrier k. We denote the power allocation
matrix of SCBS i by Ui ∈ RN×K , where [Ui]jk = uij [k] ∈
R≥0. Each SCBS has a finite power budget Pmax, and we
assume that
K∑
k=1
uipii(k)[k] =
K∑
k=1
∑
j∈Ni
uij [k] ≤ Pmax,
for all i ∈M. It is possible to extend this setting to the case
where each SCBS has its own power constraint P imax; here, we
assume that P imax = Pmax, for all i, for simplicity. Note that
under the no inter-user interference assumption, each column
of Ui can contain only one nonzero entry, for all i. Also,
SCBSs i and j will interfere if and only if uil[k] > 0 and
ujl[k] > 0 for some l ∈ N and some k ∈ K. We assume that
uij [k] > 0 if and only if k ∈ Ki. We can now formally define
the action set of SCBS i as
Ai =
{
Ui ∈ RNi×Ki≥0 : [Ui]jk = uij [k];1TUi1 ≤ Pmax;
uij [k] > 0 ⇐⇒ j = pii(k) for k ∈ Ki, j ∈ Ni} .(1)
Note that the action sets depend on the subcarrier allocation
implicitly.
Given the above, we can now write the downlink signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) achieved at user j due
to the power allocated to it by SCBS i over subcarrier k as
follows:
SINRij [k] =
|hij [k]|2d−αij uij [k]∑
l∈M
l 6=i
|hlj [k]|2d−αlj ulj [k] + σ2j [k]
,
where dij ∈ R>0 is the distance from SCBS i to user j,
hij [k] ∈ R is the channel gain from SCBS i to user j over
subcarrier k, and σ2j [k] ∈ R≥0 is the variance of the additive
zero-mean circular complex Gaussian noise at UE j over
subcarrier k. Consequently, we can write the rate allocated
by SCBS i to UE j as
Rij =
K∑
k=1
log (1 + SINRij [k]) .
Each UE requires a certain level of QoS from the SCBSs.
We denote the QoS required by UE j from SCBS i by τ ij .
Depending on the type of the user j, from the standpoint of
SCBS i, the value τ ij may or may not be known by that SCBS.
We denote the actual QoS provided by SCBS i to UE j by
τij . We assume that τij = fi(uij), where fi : R≥0 → R≥0
is a one-to-one, continuously differentiable function that maps
the power allocation uij to a certain value τij of the QoS
requirement. We let τ ij = fi(uij), uij ∈ R≥0.
We assume that each SCBS knows the exact QoS require-
ments, τ ij’s, that its frequent users need. This information is
learned over time due to the regular and periodic behavior
of these known, frequent users. Whether τij is equal to τ ij
(or equivalently, uij is equal to uij) or not for frequent
users will be be decided via an optimization problem to be
presented next. For the occasional users, we assume that the
QoS requirements are not known by the SCBSs due to the
lack of interaction between those users and the SCBSs.
Let cij(τij , τ ij) be the cost associated with allocating τij to
the j-th UE whose QoS requirement is given by τ ij . This cost
function can take many forms and must be designed so as to
penalize prospective misspending of resources, as previously
discussed. Hereinafter, without loss of generality, we choose
the following continuous cost function:
cij(τij , τ ij) = |τij − τ ij | ,
which is zero only when the SCBS matches the exact QoS
demand of the user. If j ∈ N i2 , the cost function is not well
defined because the SCBS does not have information about
the QoS requirements of occasional users. As a convention,
we set cij = 0 for all j ∈ N i2 , for all i ∈M.
We associate a utility function with each SCBS. In partic-
ular, the utility function of the i-th SCBS is given by:
Ji(Ui, U−i) =
∑
j∈Ni
Rij − ηi
∑
j∈N i1
cij(τij , τ ij), (2)
where U−i is the collection of the power allocation matrices of
the opponents of SCBS i, and ηi > 0 is a constant controlled
by the SCBS depending on what it favors more: maximizing
rate or minimizing cost. This constant will be referred to as
the “tradeoff constant” hereinafter.
We can now formulate the problem of resource allocation
as a strategic game Ξ := {M, {Ai}i∈M, {Ui}i∈M}, which is
defined by its three main components: (i)- the players being
the SCBSs inM, (ii)- the action sets Ai of the players defined
in (1), and (iii)- the utility functions Ji of the players defined
in (2), which capture the gains and costs from each resource
allocation decision. In this game, the optimization problem to
be solved by the i-th SCBS is
max
Ui∈Ai
Ji(Ui, U−i), for each fixed U−i.
We are interested in the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
(PSNE) solution of this game.
Definition 1: (Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium [20]): The
n-tuple {U?1 , . . . , U?n}, with U?i ∈ Ai, constitutes a PSNE if,
for all i ∈M, the inequality
Ji(U
?
i , U
?
−i) ≥ Ji(Ui, U?−i)
is satisfied for all Ui ∈ Ai.
According to this definition, no SCBS has an incentive to uni-
laterally deviate from the person-by-person optimal solution
{U?1 , . . . , U?n}.
Before we state the main result of this paper, we introduce
the following definitions:
σ2min := min
j∈N ,k∈K
σ2j [k], βmin := min
i∈M,j∈N
k∈K
|hij [k]|2d−αij ,(3)
σ2max := max
j∈N ,k∈K
σ2j [k], βmax := max
i∈M,j∈N
k∈K
|hij [k]|2d−αij .(4)
Further, let Kmax denote the largest number of subcarriers
allocated to a UE by an SCBS, and define
ξ1 :=
βmin(σ
2
min)
3
(M − 1)Kmaxβ3max
, ξ2 :=
1− σ2max
Mβmax
.
The following theorem establishes the existence and unique-
ness of PSNE for Ξ.
Theorem 1: (Existence and uniqueness of PSNE for the
context-aware power allocation game): Assume that the cost
function cij is linear in uij , for all i ∈M and j ∈ Ni, and that
σ2max < 1. Then, the proposed context-aware power allocation
game Ξ admits a unique PSNE if
Pmax < min {ξ1, ξ2} , (5)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 1: (Independence from the number of UEs): An
attractive feature of the condition on the maximum transmit
power provided by Theorem 1 is that it does not depend on
the number of the UEs in the network. Hence, this makes the
existence and uniqueness of PSNE guaranteed for a large class
of networks in which the number of UEs is large. •
Remark 2: (Nonlinear QoS requirements): The linearity
assumption on cij guarantees that Ji is concave in Ui, which in
turn guarantees the existence of a PSNE as stated in the proof
of Theorem 1. It is possible to extend the theorem above to
the case where cij is not linear in uij . This will entail placing
conditions on ηi in order to preserve the concavity of Ji in Ui.
In particular, we would need ∂
2
∂U2i
Ji  0, which is equivalent
to ∑
j∈Ni
∂2
∂U2i
Rij − ηi
∑
j∈N i1
∂2
∂U2i
cij(τij , τ ij)  0,
for all i ∈M. •
The following corollary proposes a method to compute the
unique PSNE of Ξ. As proposed by Rosen in [21], we allow
the players to update their strategies dynamically at a rate
that is proportional to the gradient of their utility functions,
while satisfying the power constraints. To this end, let Φi :
RN×K → Ai be the projection operator that guarantees that
the power constraint is satisfied for each player.
Corollary 1: (Computation of the unique PSNE): As-
sume that the cost function cij is linear in uij , for all i ∈M
and j ∈ Ni, and let Pmax be chosen according to (5). Then,
the dynamical system
d
dt
Ui = Φi
(
∂
∂Ui
Ji
)
, i ∈M,
is globally asymptotically stable and {U1, . . . , UM} converges
to the unique PSNE of the context-aware power allocation
game, {U?1 , . . . , U?M}, starting from any arbitrary initial con-
dition {U1(0), . . . , UM (0)}.
Proof: Under the assumptions made in the statement of
the corollary, we have G(u)+G(u)T ≺ 0, for all u ∈ Aˆ, where
G(u) and Aˆ are defined in the Appendix. The corollary then
follows by Theorem 9 in [21].
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
For simulations, consider a two-tier 500 m × 500 m square
network in which the UEs and SCBSs are deployed uniformly.
Here, the SCBSs represent operator-owned, outdoor picocells.
The noise power is set to −110 dBm. We let α = 3. The
maximum transmit power of each picocell SCBS is chosen
so as (5) is satisfied. We compute the PSNE of Ξ using
the algorithm proposed in Corollary 1. We are interested in
simulating the worst-case scenario in which each SCBS serves
all the users in the network, and that all the SCBSs serve a
given UE over the same subcarrier. Formally, we assume that
K = N , Ni = N , Ki = K, and pii(k) = pij(k) for all i ∈M
and k ∈ K.
We will compare the performance of our context-aware
allocation to two widely used allocation schemes: sum-rate
maximization and proportionally fair (PF) allocation. The sum-
rate maximization problem is maxUi∈Ai
∑
j∈Ni Rij . As in our
allocation scheme, we let the agents play a noncooperative
game. Clearly, the sum-rate maximization problem need not
yield a fair allocation. For this reason, we also compare our
scheme to the popular proportionally fair allocation scheme
which overcomes this problem at the expense of possibly
worse sum-rate compared to that provided by the sum-rate
maximization scheme. The PF allocation is the solution to the
following problem: maxUi∈Ai
∑
j∈Ni log(Rij). As in our al-
location scheme, we let the SCBSs engage in a noncooperative
game in all schemes. We compare the performance of the three
schemes by evaluating the utility functions of each SCBS as
given by (2). We assume that the QoS requirements of the
frequent UEs are certain desired power allocation levels. To
this end, we will set the QoS mappings for frequent users to
τij = fi(uij) = uij , and therefore we have cij = |uij − uij |,
for all i ∈ M and j ∈ N i1 . The true QoS requirements
of frequent users τ ij = uij are generated at random. All
statistical results are averaged over all SCBS and UE locations
via a large number of independent runs.
In Fig. 1, we compare the average utility per SBCS resulting
from all the three schemes for a network with M = 5 SCBSs,
5 occasional users, and a varying number of frequent users. For
all SCBSs, the tradeoff constants are set to ηi = 2, ∀i ∈ M.
Fig. 1 shows that, as the number of frequent users increases,
the performances of all three schemes improve due to the
additional users. Particularly, for the proposed context-aware
approach, this increase is due to the fact that this approach is
capable of exploiting the knowledge of the traffic patterns of
a larger number of users (the frequent ones) in the network
hence yielding an improved utility. In Fig. 1, we can see
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Fig. 1: Average utility per SCBS as the number of frequent users
varies, for a network with 5 SCBSs and 5 occasional users.
that the proposed context-aware game has a significant perfor-
mance improvement, in terms of the average utility per SCBSs,
compared to both PF allocation and sum-rate maximization for
any number of frequent users.
In Fig. 2, we study the impact of the tradeoff constants ηi
on the average utility for a network with 6 frequent users, 5
SCBSs, and 2 occasional users. We assume that all SCBSs
have the same tradeoff constant, i.e., ηi = η. Fig. 2 shows
that our proposed context-aware scheme outperforms sum-rate
maximization by a significant margin for all η, reaching up to
%56 for η = 30. This gain mainly stems from the fact that
sum-rate maximization does not take the misspending cost into
consideration and its performance will be inferior for networks
that place emphasis on optimizing this cost. Similarly, Fig. 2
shows that the context-aware scheme outperforms proportion-
ally fair allocation for all values of η.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a novel, context-aware
approach for resource allocation in small cell networks that is
built on the idea of categorizing the wireless users into two key
types: frequent users, who are regular users of a given small
cell, and occasional users, who are only passing users. Then,
we have formulated the problem as a noncooperative game via
which the SCBSs aim to allocate power based on their knowl-
edge of the traffic patterns of their frequent users. In particular,
the SCBSs optimize the tradeoff between maximizing the
users’ rate and minimizing the cost of misspending resources
that is associated with under or over matching the frequent
users’ demands. We have shown the existence of a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium and we have studied its properties.
Simulation results have shown promising performance gains
that context-aware schemes can provide in small cell networks.
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Fig. 2: Average utility per SCBS as the tradeoff parameter η varies,
for 5 SCBSs, 6 frequent users, and 2 occasional users.
This paper only scratches the surface of an emerging area
of context-aware resource allocation in small cell networks.
Motivated by the proximity of the users to their small cells,
we expect that future small cell networks are able to exploit
a significant amount of information knowledge on their users
so as to better service them and optimize the overall resource
usage in the network.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We start by proving the case where K = N and each
SCBS allocates only one subcarrier to a given user. We will
proceed by invoking the existence and uniqueness results of
[21]. Under the linearity assumption on fi, it follows that the
utility of the i-th player, Ji, is concave in Ui for each fixed
value of U−i. Hence, it follows by Theorem 1 in [21] that a
PSNE exists.
Before we prove the uniqueness of PSNE, we introduce
some notation to streamline our analysis. Given a certain
subcarrier allocation at SCBS i, by construction of Ai, it
follows that Ui will have a total of Ni nonzero entries. We
collect these entries into a vector ui ∈ RNi , and we denote
its entries by ui = [ui1, . . . , uiNi ]
T , where uij = uipii(kij)[k
i
j ]
and kij ∈ Ki is the subcarrier allocated by SCBS i to user
j ∈ Ni. Once the subcarrier allocation has been fixed, we
can obtain ui from Ui via a bijective mapping. Define the
following restricted action set
Aˆi =
{
ui ∈ RNi≥0 : uij = uipii(kj)[kj ];1Tui ≤ Pmax
}
,
and let Aˆ := Aˆ1× . . .×AˆM . Further, let u = [uT1 , . . . , uTM ]T ,
ui ∈ Aˆi, and define the following matrix
G(u) :=

∂2
∂u21
J1 . . .
∂2
∂u1∂uM
J1
...
. . .
...
∂2
∂u1∂uM
JM . . .
∂2
∂u2M
JM
 .
To prove uniqueness, we will invoke Theorem 6 in [21],
which states that the negative definiteness of the matrix
G(u) + G(u)T , for all u ∈ Aˆ, is a sufficient condition for
the uniqueness of PSNE. Note that the diagonal entries of
∂2
∂u2i
Ji are negative, for all i, because Ji is concave in uij , for
all j ∈ Ni. Hence, if the matrix G(u) +G(u)T is diagonally
dominant for all u ∈ Aˆ, it follows that G(u) + G(u)T is a
negative definite matrix for all Aˆ. Formally, for G(u)+G(u)T
to be diagonally dominant, we must have
2
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂u2il Ji
∣∣∣∣ > 2 ∑
h∈Ni
h6=l
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂uil∂uih Ji
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
j∈M
j 6=i
∑
h∈Ni
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂uil∂ujh Ji + ∂
2
∂uil∂ujh
Jj
∣∣∣∣ ,
for all l ∈ Ni and all i ∈ M. Note that for h 6= l, l, h ∈ Ni,
we have
∂2
∂uil∂uih
Ji =
∂
∂uih
(
∂
∂uil
(Ril − ηicil)
)
= 0,
because of our assumption that there is no inter-user interfer-
ence. Similarly, for h 6= l, l, h ∈ Ni, we have
∂2
∂uil∂ujh
Ji =
∂
∂ujh
(
∂
∂uil
(Ril − ηicil)
)
= 0,
which again follows because there is no inter-user interference,
by assumption. Using these, we can now simplify the diagonal
dominance condition to requiring
2
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂u2il Ji
∣∣∣∣ > ∑
j∈M
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂uil∂ujl Ji + ∂
2
∂uil∂ujl
Jj
∣∣∣∣ , (6)
for all l ∈ Ni and all i ∈M.
Next, we will find bounds on the terms involved in (6).
Let βij := |hij [kij ]|2d−αij and Iij =
∑
l 6=i hlj [k
l
j ]|2d−αlj ulj [klj ],
where klj ∈ Ki is the subcarrier allocated by SCBS i to user
j ∈ Ni. Note that
∂
∂uil
Ril = βil
Iil + σ
2
l
Iil + βiluil + σ2l
Using this, and recalling that cij is linear in uij , by assump-
tion, we can write
∂2
∂u2il
Ji =
∂2
∂u2il
Ril = −β2il
Iil + σ
2
l
(Iil + βiluil + σ2l )
2
.
Using the definitions in (3) and (4), we can then write∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂u2il Ji
∣∣∣∣ ≥ βminσ2min(MβmaxPmax + σ2max)2 . (7)
Assuming that SCBS i and j interfere at user l, i.e., uil[kil ],
ujl[k
j
l are both positive and k
i
l = k
j
l , we can write
∂2
∂uil∂ujl
Ji =
∂2
∂uil∂ujl
Ril
= βil
βjl(Iil + βiluil + σ
2
l )− βjl(Iil + σ2l )
(Iil + βiluil + σ2l )
2
=
βjlβ
2
iluil
(Iil + βiluil + σ2l )
2
.
Using this and the triangle inequality, we can now obtain the
following bound:∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂uil∂ujl Ji + ∂
2
∂uil∂ujl
Jj
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2β3maxPmax(σ2min)2 . (8)
Using (7) and (8), it follows that a sufficient condition for (6)
to be satisfied is:
βminσ
2
min
(MβmaxPmax + σ2max)
2
> (M − 1)β
3
maxPmax
(σ2min)
2
or
Pmax(MβmaxPmax + σ
2
max)
2 <
βmin(σ
2
min)
3
(M − 1)β3max
(9)
Then, assuming that σ2max < 1, inequality (9) can be satisfied
by choosing Pmax as in (5), where Kmax = 1 in this case,
and we recall that Kmax denotes the maximum number of
subcarriers allocated by an SCBS to a user. This completes
the proof for the case where K = N and each SCBS allocates
only one subcarrier to a given user.
For the case when K ≥ N , and the SCBSs are allowed to
allocate multiple subcarriers to a UE, let us first denote the
number of subcarriers allocated by SCBS i to user j ∈ Ni
by Kij . In this case, the dimension of vector ui would be∑
j∈Ni K
i
j . The vector ui can be obtained from Ui using a
similar procedure to the one described above. Using the no
inter-user interference assumption, we conclude that the only
change to the above steps is the inclusion of a summation over
the subcarriers allocated by SCBS j to user l ∈ Nj on the right
hand side of condition (6). To capture this extra summation,
we must change the inequality in (9) to
Pmax(MβmaxPmax + σ
2
max)
2 <
βmin(σ
2
min)
3
(M − 1)Kmaxβ3max
.
Similar to the previous case, the above inequality can be
satisfied by choosing Pmax as in (5), and the proof is complete.
